Week 13 Notes

<u>Plan</u>:

Introduction and Recap

I.   Description and Fact-Stating:

    a) Declarativism. Fact-stating in weakest sense, compatible with global expressivism. Normative facts as describing results of prescriptions.

    b) Proposal: First Dimension. Normative governance of describing by described (fact-stating by fact). Anscombe's two directions of normative 'fit'.

    c) The model of observation: also need RDRDs.

    d) Proposal: Second Dimension. Subjunctive tracking of described by describing.

II.   Descriptive Dimensions of Metalinguistic Locutions:

    a) Can metalinguistic expressions be empirical descriptions?

    b) On two-ply account, can make observational use of many expressions Sellars analyzes as 'covertly metalinguistic.'

    c) A second bifurcation problem: distinguishing metalinguistic empirical descriptions.

    d) Proposal: Distinguish narrow/broad empirical descriptions by whether subjunctive tracking is necessarily mediated by linguistic representings.

    e) Some applications: pure (ungrounded) vs. mixed (grounded) abstractions.

    f) Does alethic modal vocabulary have empirical descriptive uses in the narrow sense?

    g) Conclusion: Metalinguistic pragmatics is compatible with two-dimensional empirical descriptive pragmatics supporting a representational semantics.

Introduction and Recap:

1. Sellars's process 'nominalism':
a) We saw last week that at the end of the day, Sellars is not a nominalist.
Nominalists think that all there really is is
   i.   only
   ii.   what is referred to by real proper names (not 'onomatoids').
Sellars is largely with the nominalists on the 'only' part, (i).
They largely agree about what is *not* real: universals, relations in general, kinds, propositions (so, facts), indeed, any supposed referents of terms introduced by nominalizing other parts of speech (even sortal terms, as opposed to singular terms) and *abstracta* (meaning referents of terms introduced by abstraction).
But he ends up disagreeing with the nominalists about (ii): what there really is.
   b) His positive metaphysical project is to reconstruct everything (that there really is) in terms not only of *processes*, but of *absolute* processes, and, further, processes that do not essentially involve temporal duration—but only some more abstract generic property of which temporal duration is one species.
   These are either *particulars* in an extended sense (compare: the sense in which he claims *events* are not *really* particulars), or perhaps a proper subclass of particulars.
   What speaks against the latter reading is that they are not referred to by *terms* (singular and sortal), but by *verbs* and *adverbs*.
   c) He is gesturing at a broadly mereological (because part-whole) generic relation among absolute processes, that combines them in a way whose *conceptual appearances* exhibit the familiar categorial structure of *facts* about the *properties* and *relations* of *particular objects*—facts which stand to one another in *subjunctively robust* relations of consequence and incompatibility.
   In *SM,* S expends considerable effort constructing an account of how singular terms in conceptual appearances could be understood as appearances *of* the particulars there really are.
   I have been pressing the issue of how we are to understand the *sentences*, situated in a space of *subjunctively robust implications*, as *conceptual appearances* of a *non*conceptual *reality* that includes merely mereological type-constructors.
   This is an issue Sellars does not really address, as far as I can see.

2. More interesting, I think, than his *positive* metaphysics is Sellars's **negative** **metaphysics**. By that I mean the master argument-form that he uses to argue that many kinds of locution do not refer to anything that is "in the world in the narrow sense", which consists exclusively of things that could exist even if there never were language-users (concept-users, discursive practitioners, makers of claims and havers of thoughts).

This is his *metalinguistic expressivism*: the analyses he offers of many kinds of locutions as essentially covertly metalinguistic.

He takes it that it follows that expressions subject to such a metalinguistic analysis do not pick out (describe, state facts about) anything in the world in the narrow sense.

I contest this inference.

For I understand his metalinguistic analyses as concerning what one is *doing* in *using* (he says "making first-hand use of", meaning to exclude embedded uses, paradigmatically in propositional attitude ascriptions) expressions of that kind.

That is something properly understood as expressed in *pragmatic* a metavocabulary.

But his dismissive ontological conclusions are properly understood as expressed in *semantic* MVs. And this move is at any rate more complex and questionable than he realizes.

Breakdown of 9 instances of Sellars applying this methodology:

i. facts (states of affairs), picked out by nominalizations of sentences,

ii. universals, picked out by nominalizations of monadic predicates,

iii. relations, picked out by nominalizations of polyadic predicates—including those complex predicates (in Dummett's sense) formed by substitutionally analyzing sentences.

iv. kinds, picked out by nominalizations of sortal terms,

v. events, picked out by sentence nominalizations with temporal connectives

vi. alethic modals,

vii. *abstracta*, terms introduced by abstraction

viii. Normative, deontic.

ix. meanings,

On events: We saw him apply this generic sort of metalinguistic analysis to *abstracta*, paradigmatically to terms introduced by transcategorial nominalization (of predicates, sortals, and sentences, supposedly picking or describing universals, relations, kinds, and propositions and facts), and to *modal* vocabulary, and implicitly to *normative* vocabulary.

Last week, in looking at his second Carus lecture, we saw it applied to *event*-talk and temporal relations.

For he argues that what on the surface look like expressions for temporal relations, locutions such as 'before' and 'during', are really temporal *connectives* relating sentences.

Events are a category of *particular* picked out by *nominalizing* those sentences, so as to be fit to be the *relata* of the supposed temporal *relations*.

For event-talk, need both:

a) events involve both nominalizing verbs, by gerunds, and

b) locutions like 'happens', 'takes place,' 'occurs', (cf. 'obtains' for states of affairs).

These are puzzling locutions, when one asks exactly what one means by them.

S has a detailed answer.

(a) is for S already objectionable on general grounds of metalinguisticness.

(b) He offers metalinguistic readings of the locutions in (b).
They all go through 'true'. So, he argues, they are, like 'true', metalinguistic.

This is a substantial expansion of his metalinguistic expressivism.
It would be exceptionally interesting to compare and contrast this Sellarsian analysis and proposal for a "temporal connective theory of time," with Huw Price's expressive treatment of time—in the sense of what is expressed by temporal locutions—in *Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point* (1996) and since.

Deflation of event-talk is not a new or late-coming thought for Sellars.
He had already explored such a line of thought in **his massive "Time and the World Order."**
This is an essay that he never reprinted, and which is barely discussed—except by his late student (I don't mean Pedro is no longer with us, just that he was one of Wilfrid's last doctoral students), who has written a book ms. about it.

3. Sellars's method of metalinguistic analysis and subsequent ontological demotion on that basis threatens to become a kind of ***aqua regia***—the legendary "universal solvent". The problem with *aqua regia* was that one could not see how to *use* it, because it can dissolve *anything*. How does one contain or transport it?
In Sellars's case, his metalinguistic analyses are sufficiently comprehensive that they threaten to dissolve everything that could be used to understand the notion of an objective material world "in the narrow sense."
For everything that could be found there, or hold together what is found there, is in danger of being 'dissolved' metalinguistically, and so extruded from the inner sanctum (the *sanctum sanctorum* or sacred refuge or safe space) of the real.

4. We need to consider the possibility that ***every* location is in Sellars's sense "covertly metalinguistic."** (Compare: Matt Levine's slogan that "Everything is securities fraud.")
For the (norms governing the) *use* of *any* sentence (or kind of subsentential expression) depends on the (norms governing the) use of *other* sentences. Its use has as necessary conditions the propriety of using other sentences—for it has consequences of application.
We had better not use 'metalinguistic' in such a capacious way that being metalinguistic in *that* sense precludes expressions from talking about or expressing what is real (really real, real in the "narrow" sense).

5. To introduce the topic of this week:
Sellars faces his own "**bifurcation problem**": to pick out a sense of 'metalinguistic' that is *narrower* than the one championed by *declarativism* for descriptive or fact-stating uses.

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He needs this in order to hand over ultimate authority about the description of *material* reality, or "the world in the narrow sense" of what would be there even if there were and never had been or would be concept-users, to natural science, in the *scientia mensura*.

I do think this can be done, appealing to Sellarsian principles.

But Sellars himself does not do it.

Sellars's *original* insight (though he never put things this way) was that Carnap's expansive use of 'metalinguistic' in characterizing the use of some expressions could serve as a contemporary account of Kantian *categories*: in particular, *modality*.

6. What I want to understand as S's *pragmatic* metalinguistic expressivist analyses of the principal *uses* of a variety of expressions—for instance, of event-talk—are genuinely illuminating. Once we free ourselves from taking ourselves to be obliged to draw invidious or derogatory *ontological* conclusions from them, we can appreciate those analyses as the achievements they are.

I)   <u>Description and Fact-Stating:</u>
   a) Declarativism. Fact-stating in weakest sense, compatible with global expressivism. Normative facts as describing results of prescriptions.
   b) Proposal: First Dimension. Normative governance of describing by described (fact-stating by fact). Anscombe's two directions of normative 'fit'.
   c) The model of observation: also need RDRDs.
   d) Proposal: Second Dimension. Subjunctive tracking of described by describing.

<u>Overall Lesson</u>

<u>Background</u>:
I will distinguish 4 nested classes of expression-uses, corresponding to the diagram below.
They are four different ways of understanding **'fact-stating'**, **'descriptive'**, or **'representational'** uses.
(Of course one need not take this trio as picking out the same uses. There are good reasons to distinguish them. But for the purposes of my argument, it is worth considering them together, since the dialectic is the same, and people taking up positions w/res to one or another of these accordingly often make the same arguments.)
The most capacious identifies fact-stating (etc.) with the use of *declarative* sentences: the sentences whose free-standing utterance has the default pragmatic significance of *asserting*, *stating*, the making of *claims*.
The most restrictive identifies fact-stating (etc.) with *empirical descriptions* in a *narrow* sense. These are empirical descriptions of what Sellars calls "the world in the *narrow* sense".
In between are *descriptions* generally, and more specifically, *empirical* descriptions.
So the divisions are:
   1. Declarative-assertional uses,
   2. Descriptive uses,
   3. Empirical descriptive uses,
   4. Empirical descriptive uses in the narrow, relatively discourse-independent sense.

The eventual story will have this form:

Nested Kinds of Use	Contrasts with	Defined by
Declaratives Most General Fact-Stating	Imperatives, Interrogatives	'Situation in space of implications' Assertible. Can be premises and conclusions of inferences Embeddable in conditionals and negations Truth-Evaluable
Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Prescriptions	Normative direction of fit is word to world
Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Fictional Descriptions	1) Normative governance of describings by describeds 2) Subjunctive tracking of describeds by describings
Narrowly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Broadly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Subjunctive tracking not necessarily mediated by tokenings of linguistic expressions

Claims:

- '*Descriptivism*', against which Sellars warns us (in CDCM), and what I shall call '*declarativism*' are twin errors with a common root.
- Both stem from ignoring the distinctions among declaratives, descriptions, empirical descriptions, and narrowly empirical descriptions.
- *Descriptivism* assimilates everything to the most restrictive understanding of descriptions (or perhaps to one of the broader ones), while *declarativism* refuses to make any distinctions of kind.
- The typical dialectic is to appreciate the difficulties of one of these extreme positions and to respond by recoiling to the other.
  So, seeing what is wrong with a more restrictive descriptivism, some philosophers recoil to full-blown declarativism. Huw Price originally followed Rorty (and in some ways Geach) on this path.

Or, seeing what is wrong with declarativism, some philosophers recoil to too narrow a form of descriptivism. Most traditional model-theoretic semantics, possible worlds semantics, and truthmaker semantics is at least implicitly embedded in a pragmatics of this sort.

The *Tractatus* is the purest form of narrow descriptivism, and the later Wittgenstein admirably recants not by recoiling to declarativism but by pointing out important distinctions. His overreaction (I think) is rather to throwing up his hands and giving up on the project of theoretically systematizing those distinctions in any. When he warns us against assuming that because the surface grammar of some potentially problematic locutions (say, first-person pain avowals) is that of declarative sentences that their use should be understood as fact-stating in any narrow sense, he does *not* go on to tell us how to understand any such narrower senses of 'fact-stating'.

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1.   (a) Declarativism, and its associated problematic: metaphysical extravagance or bifurcation.

   a. Declarativism about *descriptive*, *fact-stating*, and *representational* uses (of course one might distinguish these in various ways) is the view that these uses coincide with the use of declarative sentences.

   b. Declarative sentences are the sentences:

   i.   Whose free-standing uses have the default significance of *assertions* or *claimings*, expressing *beliefs* or *doxastic commitments*.
   Cf. the "iron triangle of discursiveness", connecting
   - Declarative sentences on the *syntactic* side,
   - Asserting on the *pragmatic* side, and
   - Truth-evaluability on the *semantic* side.

and

   ii.   Which *embed*, paradigmatically in negations and as the antecedents of conditionals, but also in propositional attitude-ascribing locutions such as "…believes that__", "…intends that__" and "…desires that__".

   c. The most straightforward response to the Frege-Geach embedding objection to force-expressivism about various locutions, paradigmatically normative vocabulary, is declarativism: Acknowledge as descriptive, fact-stating, or proposition-expressing all uses of declarative sentences.
   The two features (i) and (ii) above do seem to go with *truth-evaluability* in its most general sense.

When Sellars introduces the distinction between labeling and describing

He really offers sufficient conditions on 'description' only in the declarativist sense of *assertible*.

The Sellarsian way of distinguishing 'describing' from 'labeling', by 'situation in a space of implications' picks out describing only in a very general, unbifurcated sense. It is sufficient for this, but only necessary for the less extensive notion of description I'll define.

A key point here is that **insisting on "location in a space of implications" is *not* sufficient, by Sellars's own lights, for being 'descriptive' in the sense in which, according to the *scientia mensura*, (natural) science is authoritative in the "dimension of describing and explaining". w/res to that, this condition is necessary, but not sufficient**.
So we need to ask: what else is required (what are sufficient conditions for) being 'descriptive' in the sense in which the *scientia mensura* accords authority to (natural) science?
I will claim that it is *empirical* descriptions in the *narrow* sense.
That is, one needs *two more* distinctions ('bifurcations') *beyond* that needed to distinguish (a *very* extensive notion of) 'description' from mere labeling.

The "space of implications", which Sellars uses to distinguish describing from mere labeling (classifying as mere differential responsiveness) which basically *is* the subjunctive tracking condition (not all labeling is in presence, or is a kind of report-label, so talk of labeling corresponds to the non-observational side of describing) is the criterion of *declarative sentencehood*. For it is the condition of concept-use, conceptual contentfulness, on the semantic side, and the speech act of *assertion*.

Being the space of implications in this sense is what confers conceptual content, on Sellars's inferentialist understanding of conceptual content. And it is that content that contributes to the conceptual content of sentences in which it is embedded—paradigmatically, as the antecedent of a conditional, or something that can be negated (the contexts of embedding Geach focuses on in his two articles).

The declarative genus is what is assertible-claimable, which is what is in the first instance conceptually contentful, because inferentially articulated.

  2. *Pro*s and *con*s of declarativism:

  a) Pro: The most straightforward response to the Frege-Geach embedding objection to force-expressivism about various locutions, paradigmatically normative vocabulary, is declarativism: Acknowledge as descriptive, fact-stating, proposition-expressing, or representational all uses of declarative sentences.

  b) Pro (pulling in the opposite, antirepresentationalist direction):

This deflated use avoids what Huw Price calls the "bifurcation problem": drawing a line between a narrower class of genuinely descriptive, fact-stating, truth-evaluable, or representational and a wider class of expressions that are only misleadingly thought of this way.

(I am on my way to a proposal as to how to make just such a 'bifurcation'.)

c) Pro: All declarative uses not only embed, they also are *truth-evaluable*.

Deflationary accounts of 'true', such as the prosentential one (which I take to be the most sophisticated and satisfactory), but others such as Paul Horwich's, which take Tarski's T-sentences to give us the essence of the use of 'true', support declarativism *about truth-evaluability*.

This consideration is an important part of Huw Price's case for global expressivism.

d) Con: One must admit a vast and motley range of kinds of facts:

Not just culinary and nautical facts, but negative and conditional facts, probabilistic facts, modal facts, semantic facts, intentional and psychological facts, aesthetic facts, mathematical facts, and normative and moral facts.

A uniform semantic and pragmatic account is being bought at the price of metaphysical extravagance: the need to make sense of a plethora of wildly different kinds of facts and states of affairs.

If, in a *Tractarian descriptivist* spirit, one is tempted to think of facts as arrangements of objects, or as particulars standing in relations to one another, the difficulty of making sense in these terms of such exotica as normative facts—the way particulars have to be related in which the fact that S *ought* to perform action A consists—exerts substantial pressure for a recoil back to some sort of bifurcation, requiring quite different accounts of the semantics of large and important classes of declarative sentences.

Combining declarativism with a narrowly descriptivist or representational model of fact-stating is a recipe for disaster.

As Rorty points out, there are real troubles trying to use the semantic model that makes good sense for

> The frog is on the log,

to make sense of the content of declarative sentences such as

> Justice is a virtue,
> Romanticism over-reacted against the Enlightenment,
> Cezanne taught us to see surfaces differently,
> and
> Sellars was a deeper thinker than Quine.

e) A lot of Anglophone philosophy of the twentieth century can be understood as consisting of attempts to navigate this problematic:

> **the choice between *promiscuous representationalism* and *semantic bifurcation*.**

Rorty's and Price's global antirepresentationalism, as something like declarativism plus expressivism, is one program for responding to the difficulties with bifurcationist representationalism and its carving out a notion of "facts (the world) in the narrow sense."

    f)   Note that if one does accept the need for some bifurcation—as Sellars clearly does—one need not take an *invidious* attitude towards what is expressed by sentences that are *not* classified as being 'descriptive in the narrow sense.'
That is, rejecting *declarativism* need not commit one to '*descriptivism*' in Sellars's sense, as he urges when he says:

[O]nce the tautology 'The world is described by descriptive concepts' is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an *ungrudging* recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not *inferior,* just *different.* [CDCM §79]

    3.   Sellars himself, in this passage, and in the protasis to the *scientia mensura*, which restricts the sovereign authority of natural science to the "the dimension of describing and explaining the world," is committed to a bifurcationist approach.
    a)   Independently of his nominalist commitment to a world consisting of particulars or absolute processes, he is committed to the notion of the world "in the narrow sense," the world as *described by* eventual natural science.
    b)   But what does he mean by 'description' or descriptive uses of expressions?
He never squarely addresses this issue.
    c)   Note that in this regard, he is far from alone, even among the greats.
The later Wittgenstein, too, warns us against descriptivism, in the sense of rejecting the idea that all declarative sentences are to be understood on the descriptive model applicable to 'The frog is on the log.' But, like Sellars, he never tells us how he understands that model.
Perhaps they both thought that it was enough to point to the *Tractatus*, as the purest distillation of that sort of descriptivism.

Proposal: First Dimension.
Normative governance of describing by described (fact-stating by fact). Anscombe's two directions of normative 'fit'.

    4.   But I think we are in a position to do better.
I want to propose a two-dimensional account, generalized from the two-ply account of observation that I find in *EPM*.
That two-ply account distinguishes a normative conceptual component from a modal RDRD component. The latter distinguishes specifically *observational* uses of concepts from other uses, since *all* concept use is for Sellars a normative affair of implicit practical proprieties governing language-language moves, as well as language-entry and language-exit transitions (SRLG).

Proposal: First Dimension.

Normative governance of describing by described
(fact-stating by fact).
Anscombe's two directions of normative 'fit'.
*De*scriptive uses distinguished from *pre*scriptive uses by normative direction of fit.

Anscombe's story of the two lists:
- **The shopper's list is authoritative for, in the sense of providing the standard for assessments of correctness of items in the cart.**
- **The items in the cart are authoritative for, in the sense of providing the standard for assessments of the correctness of the detective's list.**

This shows us the essential difference of *normative direction of fit* between
- **the *prescriptive* pragmatic significance of the shopper's list and**
- **the *descriptive* pragmatic significance of the detective's list.**

Not all prescriptive uses are declarative.
"Clean up your room!" and "Let go of me!" are not.
But some uses with prescriptive force are declarative.
"You should clean up your room," and "You should let go of me," are both declarative and prescriptive.
Note: Some describings have prescriptive consequences:
"The light is red. So, you should stop."

What it prescribes is just what it *says*, indeed, *describes* ("If the lights are off, the door should be shut.")
The difference between describing the state of affairs ("The lights are off and the door is shut,") and prescribing it (marked by the 'should') is precisely the direction of fit of *both* normative governance *and* subjunctive tracking.
In the prescription, the actual state of affairs tracks and is normatively governed by the saying.
In the description, the saying tracks and is normatively governed by the actual state of affairs.

Note that descriptive/prescriptive are just the two *basic* directions of normative fit.
Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) cycles are describe-prescribe-describe-exit cycles, with conditional branched-schedule algorithms at their heart.

It follows that
Requiring the descriptive direction of normative fit carves out a proper subclass of declaratives.

5. The model of observation: *Empirical* descriptions also need RDRDs—in addition to the word-to-world direction of normative fit.

a) ***Empirical* Description (describing, descriptive use of expressions) has both a *semantic* dimension and an *epistemic* dimension**.
Semantic:
Specifying a world-word direction of normative fit—what we can now call a *descriptive* direction of fit, addresses the *semantic* dimension. For it says that what one describes or represents, the fact one states, serves as the standard of assessment for the *correctness* of the describing, in a distinctive, semantic sense of 'correct'. (There are other, nonsemantic dimensions of assessment: of rudeness or social propriety, conversational aptness….)
If we like, we can say that these are *truth* assessments—hence the rubric 'semantic'.
We can also think of the standard of assessments of semantic correctness as specifying what one is *committing* oneself to (how one is committing oneself to things being) by using a description (stating a fact).

But for specifically *empirical* descriptions, there is a further dimension:
Epistemic:
But there is also a question of something like *justification*, corresponding to the issue of *entitlement* to one's descriptive commitment.
This is an issue of something like how describers are sufficiently "in touch" with what they are describing that there is any point in holding them responsible for the correctness of their descriptive claims.

This second dimension is characteristic of a proper subclass of descriptions: specifically *empirical* descriptions.
These are descriptions subject to a special kind of epistemic-justificatory assessment of one's entitlement to the description.

Empirical descriptions are the home language-game of describing.
Non-empirical descriptions are an *essentially parasitic* and in some ways *degenerate* suburb of this downtown area.
One principal species of this genus of nonempirical descriptive uses is in ***fiction***.
Though writing fiction involves aspects of intentional agency that need not be involved in all claiming or describing, it would be a mistake to understand it as having a purely world-to-word direction of fit in the sense in which true prescriptives do.
What fiction principally lacks is the second, epistemic dimension of empirical description: *subjunctive tracking* of what is described by describings of it.

Note that in focusing on this special case of empirical description, I am in effect re-writing the *scientia mensura*, to make explicit what I take to be implicit in it:

"In the dimension of *empirical* describing and explaining the *material* world (*"the world in the narrow sense"*), *natural* science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not." [EPM §41, revised]

(I would further amend "that it is" to "that *and how* it is," but that is a different issue.)

b) A good way to think about the central special case of *empirical* descriptions is to look to a paradigm.

And **the core of empirical describing is *noninferential reporting*: "The traffic light is red."**
After all, it is the relation of descriptions to noninferential reports that makes them *empirical* descriptions—though we must be careful not to understand this relation on too simple a model.

Now it would be *too* restrictive to limit description to noninferential reporting.
Physicists can describe happenings in the first two minutes of the universe and interactions of quarks in a proton that we have not observed.
Strategy:
But we can look to the structure of species of paradigmatically descriptive noninferential reports for clues to the nature of the wider genus of empirical description.

On the two-ply model of observational uses of concepts that I have argued Sellars introduces in *EPM*, while all concept use is implicitly *normative*, and Sellars has explicitly argued that "being situated in a space of implications" is a *necessary* condition for *describing* (rather than merely labeling), observational uses of concepts require also elicitation of tokenings by the exercise of reliable differential responsive dispositions: RDRDs.
We can generalize that by seeing it as an instance of the systematic subjunctive dependence of representings on representeds—in the paradigmatic case, of observings on observeds.
This is to say that *if* what is described *were* (or *had been*) different, the describing *would be* (or *would have been*) different.

6. **So I am proposing (on Sellars's behalf) a model of *empirical descriptive uses*, modelled on his two-ply account of *observational* uses, as essentially requiring two dimensions of dependence of describings on what is described:**

i. *Normative semantic governance of representings by representeds*, **in that what is represented serves as the standard for assessments of the correctness of empirical descriptive representings *as* representings *of* those representeds, and**

ii. *Subjunctive epistemic tracking of representeds by representings*, **in that (under the right conditions—compare "standard conditions for observation") if the representeds *were* (or *had been*) different, the empirical descriptive reprsentings *would be* (or *would have been*) correspondingly different. "Correspondingly" is**

> the analogue of the *reliability* condition on the RDRDs (reliable differential responsive dispositions) in observational uses.

The first condition, of semantic governance, will be specified using *deontic normative* vocabulary of 'correctness' of describings and 'authority' (of described over describing) and 'responsibility' (of describing to described).

The second condition, of epistemic tracking, will be specified using *alethic modal* vocabulary of subjunctive conditionals codifying the matter-of-factual dependence of describings on described, via causal chains of reliably covarying events linking described to describings.

> The whole discussion should be understood as taking place in a *pragmatic metavocabulary*, since what is being specified is a distinctive kind of *use* expressions can have, namely *empirical descriptive* uses. Insofar as some expression-kinds have these uses as their core, characteristic uses, we can also talk about 'empirical descriptive *vocabulary*'. That classification will still be part of a *pragmatic* metavocabulary.

7. On this account *observational* uses count as empirically descriptive.
But so do many applications of *theoretical* terms. Recall that these are for Sellars (we can now say) *empirical descriptive* uses that are *not* observational *non*inferential reports, because (at this stage in inquiry) the theoretical terms have only *inferential* circumstances of application.

> Nonetheless, the theoretical claims can still count as empirically descriptive, for they are not only normatively semantically governed by the worldly items they describe, but can subjunctively track them. The condition on the existence of such tracking relations is that the inferences that articulate the conceptual contents of the theoretical terms must be *good* inferences. That is, if the space of subjunctively robust implications that articulates the contents of the theoretical concepts A and B permits the inference from 'x is an A' to 'x is a B', it must be the case that if anything *were* an A then it *would be* a B, if 'A'-talk and 'B'-talk is to epistemically track (and so, empirically describe) As and Bs.

> Recall that Sellars emphasizes in *EPM* that the distinction between objects and states of affairs that our empirical access to is observational and those that our empirical access to is inferential, that is observable and theoretical objects and states of affairs, are not to be understood as *ontologically* distinct. They are only *epistemologically* or *methodologically* distinct.

He argues for this by pointing out that things routinely cross the line from theoretical to observable. Insofar as our theories are good ones, that is, insofar as the implications that articulate the conceptual contents expressed by those theoretical terms are good ones, the theoretical objects are real empirical objects. As such, they cannot be *necessarily* unobservable. They must be only *contingently* so, because we are unable to situate ourselves in standard conditions for observing them.

We can now see that this means that the subjunctive dependence of empirical descriptive representings on empirically described representeds can be inferentially mediated as well as a matter of noninferential RDRDs.

8. So, in putting forward this two-dimensional account of what distinguishes *empirical descriptive uses* of linguistic expressions from nondescriptive or nonempirical descriptive ones, I am just applying and extending metaconceptual raw materials Sellars has put on the table.

This is meant to be a more careful definition of what I have talked about as

'OED' vocabulary: ordinary, empirical, descriptive vocabulary.

I am claiming that this double-barreled criterion of normative semantic governance and epistemic subjunctive tracking solves Sellars's '*bifurcation* problem'.

a) It is the natural extension of his two-ply account of noninferential reports and his understanding of the relations between *theoretical* empirical concepts and those that, in addition to the roles they play in a space of subjunctively robust implications, have *non*inferential, observational uses.

b) It cuts at the proper joints for his globally *antidescriptivist* stance, in which it is situated.

c) And it is at least a good first step in the direction of the generic restrictions on the *scientia mensura* assignment of authority to natural science over a class of claims (though we'll see we need something still more to get this right).

9. **Treating this two-dimensional deontic/alethic criterion of demarcation of a narrower-than-declarativist domain of empirical descriptive uses of linguistic expressions as a working hypothesis, I want to explore the consequences of applying it to Sellars's distinction between the world or reality in a *narrow* sense and the world in the *wider* sense that includes discursive practices and their products.**

I want to bring this normative-governance plus subjunctive-tracking model of empirical descriptive uses into contact with Sellars's *positive **metalinguistic metaphysics*** for the whole variety of expressions I retailed earlier: the products of various kinds of nominalization, including introducing terms by abstraction.

In particular I want to ask, does the distinction between the world in the narrow sense and the world in the wider sense *coincide with* the distinction between what can correctly be empirically described and what cannot?

We have seen that the wide/narrow distinction on the side of reality has at least three dimensions:

i. Descriptive-explanatory (we know that for Sellars "the explanatory and the descriptive resources of the language advance hand in hand"—CDCM),

ii. the authority of natural science, according to the *scientia mensura*, and

iii. independence of discursive activity—which is what disqualifies essentially metalinguistic expressions from being descriptive of the world in the narrow sense.

Although the *scientia mensura* slogan seems to line up the privileging of natural science with empirical description, I want to argue that better understanding of Sellars's view would have it that the narrow/wide distinction is a distinction *within* what is empirically describable.
The picture as I see it is accordingly this one:

I have hatched the area labeled "Non-empirical Descriptions" to indicate that the label only applies to what is *outside* the "Wide Empirical Descriptions" oval.
It probably would have been better to just use 'Descriptions', and emphasize the nesting.

I turn to that argument about what is needed to count as describing the world in the narrow sense.

It is not enough just to require that what is described is not itself linguistic.

II)   <u>Descriptive Dimensions of Metalinguistic Locutions:</u>
  a) Can metalinguistic expressions be empirical descriptions?
  b) On two-ply account, can make observational use of many expressions Sellars analyzes as 'covertly metalinguistic.'
  c) A second bifurcation problem: distinguishing metalinguistic empirical descriptions.
  d) Proposal: Distinguish narrow/broad empirical descriptions by whether subjunctive tracking is necessarily mediated by linguistic representings.
  e) Some applications: pure (ungrounded) vs. mixed (grounded) abstractions.
  f) Does alethic modal vocabulary have empirical descriptive uses in the narrow sense?
  g) Conclusion: Metalinguistic pragmatics is compatible with two-dimensional empirical descriptive pragmatics supporting a representational semantics.

1. Q1: Can metalinguistic expressions have empirical descriptive uses?

A: Sure. Pragmatic metavocabularies can empirically describe the use of linguistic expressions. Now some aspects of that use are essentially normative, and one might think (Sellars does think) that normative vocabulary is *not* empirically descriptive, because it is at base prescriptive.

But what S calls 'sign-designs' or 'natural linguistic objects' can be empirically described—as they must be for picturing relations involving them to be defined.

And because "norms induce regularities" there are regularities that can be empirically described. Metalinguistic descriptions of those sign-designs and regularities involving them can both normatively govern the correctness of those describings, and can be epistemically tracked by them.

2. Q2: What about the kind of expressions that Sellars analyzes as '*covertly metalinguistic*'?

Can *they* have empirical descriptive uses?

On the account I have offered what is *observable* is *a fortiori empirically describable*. Observability—what one can *see* to be the case—is the hallmark of paradigmatic cases of empirical description/fact-stating.

We have seen that S understands *theoretical* entities and states of affairs to be *in principle* observable. That is why there is no ontological, but only an epistemological difference between observable/theoretical concepts and claims.

Claim:

Many of the expressions S analyzes as covertly metalinguistic have observational uses, according to his (admittedly unusually capacious) two-ply characterization of noninferentially elicited observation reports.

  a) We can use the right kind of *fact-stating sentences* observationally, since I can *see that*, for instance, the light has turned red or the frog is on the log.

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b) I can noninferentially report the presence of *properties* (red, square, heavy, tall…) and *relations* (between, on top of, behind…).

c) *Kinds*: I can see the dog, and dogs.

d) Events: can see the branch breaking, the dancing of the ballerina…

e) And as I argued when I introduced the two-ply account of observation, under the right circumstances I can hear not just the noise you made, but what you *said*: the *meaning* you expressed—in the same sense in which I can on this account *literally* see previously theoretical entities such as mu-mesons, with the right instruments. I am hearing it and not seeing it because if you cover my ears, I can't hear the meanings any more, as I can't see them in your note if you cover my eyes.

f) Similarly, under the right circumstances—and if I am properly brought up, I can see some normative states of affairs: the cruelty of a blow, the bravery of an act.
As with meanings, there need not be *secondary qualities* perceived as part of these observations—though they might show up in the causal chain of reliably covarying events that underlies the RDRDs I am exercising.
Indeed, the idea of *Gibsonian affordances* is that the *most primitive*—certainly prelinguistic—form of perception *is* perception of *proprieties* and *possibilities*. For affordances are normative and modal: what role something *could* play, or what it *would be good* for in the lived life of the animal. Paradigmatic affordances are 'good place to hide', 'good to eat'…
Can *also* describe **affordances** (thought of as primitive normative states of affairs), although they are a kind of practical propriety—worth thinking about because they are plausibly the *primitive* form of normative states of affairs. And affordances *are* response-dependent properties as well as normative properties. They are states of affairs that are *appropriately* responded to in a particular way.

g) Abstracta: At least some *numbers* can be visible. I can see that there are *three* apples.

Conclusion:
Both the normative governance *and* the subjunctive tracking conditions that I have suggested we treat as individually necessary and jointly sufficient for empirical descriptive uses of expressions can be satisfied for many of the locutions Sellars argues are essentially metalinguistic.

3.   So should we conclude that metalinguistic expressions are empirically descriptive in the same sense that sentences such as "The frog is on the log," are?
Here is *another* 'bifurcation problem.'
Sellars needs to distinguish the sense in which these metalinguistic expressions are empirically descriptive from the sense in which his paradigmatic cases are, on pain of losing the 'world in the narrow sense' vs. 'world in the broad sense' distinction.
He cannot use *this* notion of <u>empirical description</u> to distinguish first-class ontological status.

And here, too, we can turn to Sellars's own arguments to find what we need.
Here we can take our cue from the SRLG way of distinguishing *rule-governedness* from mere *regularity* (with pattern-governedness in the middle, as showing how rule-governedness can emerge).
There Sellars argued that the important issue is whether *representations* (represent*ings*) of rules play an essential role in the regularity being as it is, that is, in the *subjunctively reliable covariance* of what is done on what the rule prescribes.
This was explicitly put forward as his version of Kant's distinction between acting *according to rules*, that is regularly, as everything in nature does, and acting according to *conceptions* (Kant's word is 'Vorstellungen', representations) of rules.

This *causal* dependence of represented*s* on *representings* is a sensible criterion of *not* being in 'the world in the narrow sense', which excludes features that are *reference-dependent* (not sense-dependent) on discursive practices.

<u>Definition</u>:
So I propose that we distinguish empirical descriptions in a *narrow* sense from empirical descriptions in a *broad* sense.
Empirical descriptions in the *narrow* sense are those where the epistemic subjunctive tracking relation does *not essentially or necessarily depend*, anywhere along the chain of reliably covarying events connecting represented to empirical descriptive representings, *upon linguistic representings*.

<u>Some observation</u>s:
- Of course, *all* concept-use essentially involves the linguistic representings that are finally applied. It is depending essentially on *mediating* linguistic representings that is forbidden for the narrow class of empirical descriptive uses.
- Objection: The very case you call upon to justify your definition of narrow descriptions, as not involving reliance on representings, undercuts the distinction. For SRLG says that *all* concept use depends on representations of rules, on the part of the teachers.
Response: True. But that is not the kind of reliance on representings that is invoked in my definition. For that definition specifically looks to the subjunctive tracking relation, and asks whether *that*, once established, relies on or depends upon (the causal chain of reliably covariant events includes) representings. And that is not at all what the general reliance of rule-governdness (SRLG) on representings of rules by teachers enforces.

- Theoretical terms have only inferential circumstances of application. The premises of those inferences are, by definition of 'premises', linguistic expressions (representings).

But, as our discussion of the class of theoretical entities as not ontologically, but only epistemologically distinct from observable ones emphasized, Sellars's views about the shiftability of the boundary between them entails that no theoretical object or fact is *essentially unobservable*. Its unobservability by us now is *always* a contingent matter about our relations to it. So such terms are not *necessarily* only applicable inferentially—that is, in a way that involves other linguistic representings.

Some applications:

Applied to ***abstraction,*** the account makes a crucial distinction. This distinction is perhaps the best fruit of the account, and a major justification-rationale for adopting it.
For it militates against counting statements of *pure* set theory (based entirely on ∅, so having no urelements) as fact-stating in a narrow sense.
Consider: All descriptions involve a linguistic component, on the side of the representings that subjunctively track and are normatively governed by what is represented-described.
I can, I think, subjunctively track pure sets.
But I can *only* do that in a way that *essentially* and *unavoidably* requires linguistic expressions *in the chain of reliably covarying events* that makes up the tracking RDRD.
This is *not* so for visible or audible particulars, properties-relations, and facts (states of affairs = possible facts)—on the side of observation.
The thought is that it is fair enough to banish from "the world in the narrow sense", the world as it would or could be if there were no discursive practices or practitioners, so no specifically *conceptual* appearances of it, anything the capacity so much as differentially to respond to (not yet *conceptually* respond, because *all* of those responses are only in "the world in the broader sense") essentially depends on linguistic representations of it.

Some **abstracta (=things our semantic access to is mediated by terms introduced by abstraction) do *not* require subjunctive tracking that goes through linguistic expressions. For suitable material objects, I can *see* how many apples there are (for some numbers and some presentations) in a *non*inferential way. I do not *need* to *count* them (which essentially uses numbers).**
Now it is true that if I could not count, I could not see not only that the apples are red, but that there are three of them. But that is no more disqualifying of observability (and so descriptive fact-statingness) than the fact that I could not *see that they are red* unless I could use some ●red●. (To think otherwise is to commit to the Myth of the Given.)
That a certain responsive ability, the capacity to master some RDRD and so the corresponding concept as observable (the secondary-quality version) depends on one's being able to use *other* concepts is not disqualifying.
The proposed criterion is that the chain of reliably covarying events that connects the concept-user to what it subjunctively tracks need not include linguistic expressions.

And the claim is that that is so for some uses of number, as well as for other observable properties, and can be so for other terms introduced by abstraction, **but is *not* true for discrimination of ∅, {∅}, {∅,{∅}}, and so on**.

a) I have throughout queried S's nominalism by asking what the difference that makes a difference is between theoretical terms and claims, which can characterize reality in the narrow sense, and abstract terms and claims, which cannot.
Now we are in a position to formulate a convincing answer on S's behalf:
The most objectionable abstracta, pure sets, are *essentially* and *in principle* only accessible *inferentially*, that is, in a way that depends on linguistic representings (compare: representations of rules). Both the subjunctive tracking of *pure* abstracta by our claims and our claims' normative governance by them *essentially* and *unavoidably* depend on discursive representings used in inference. In this regard they are to be distinguished from theoretical entities.

b) At this point might look at whether *properties, relations,* and *states of affairs* satisfy the criterion of eligibility for inclusion in the world in the narrow sense. Does *their* observability *essentially* depend on our representings of them, in order to understand either claims normative governance by or subjunctive tracking of them?
Not so long as we mean the use of the *predicates*. The question of the use of *nominalizations* of the predicates—the singular terms that refer to *properties* such as circularity and *relations* such as betweenness are another matter.

c) It is plausible that *pure sets* are *in principle* only epistemically accessible to us with the mediation of representings of them. But this is *not* true of terms introduced by abstraction and claims about them in general. For if the equivalence relations and the representings picked out by the base vocabulary on the basis of which *abstracta* are introduced are themselves material or concrete (compare: sets with concrete ur-elements). Thus one can come to *see* that there are three apples, *non*inferentially, just as one can come to see *that* there is a mu-meson or Toltec potsherd.

In this sense, numerical properties can be in the world in the narrow sense.

Sellarsian raw materials drawn on here:

1. It is only because the expressions in terms of which we describe objects…locate these objects in a space of implications, that they describe at all, rather than merely label. [CDCM §108]
2. [O]nce the tautology 'The world is described by descriptive concepts' is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an *ungrudging* recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not *inferior,* just *different.* [CDCM §79]
3. Two-ply account of observation, from EPM.

4. Characterization of observable/theoretical distinction as epistemological rather than ontological.
5. Distinction between 'the world in the narrow sense,' and the world in the 'broader' sense that includes discursive practices.
6. S's master-argument that essentially *metalinguistic* concepts do not specify items in the world in the narrow sense.
7. SRLG invocation of causal involvements of *representings* of a rule to distinguish the rule-governed from the merely regular.

Note that all of this is clarification needed *in advance of* the *scientia mensura* and the kind of scientific naturalism it expresses. For we need to understand the apodosis of the *scientia mensura*: "in the domain of describing and explaining" in order to understand the scope of the authority Sellars is assigning to natural science.

We also need it to understand Sellars's *antidescriptivism* (from CDCM):

[O]nce the tautology 'The world is described by descriptive concepts' is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an *ungrudging* recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not *inferior,* just *different.* [CDCM §79]

8. It is important that **on the line I am pursuing, S can cheerfully acknowledge that predicates, sentences, locutions introduced by abstraction, and alethic modal expressions, also events and temporal relation-words are *descriptive* (have descriptive uses), while distinguishing between *metalinguistic* descriptions and statements of fact and *narrow* ones.**
It is *that* distinction that I am suggesting be made by distinguishing, among descriptive uses that have both normative governance by and subjunctive tracking of the facts they state (so, the right word-to-world direction of fit), between those in which specifically the subjunctive tracking *essentially* depends upon (has as a necessary condition) the involvement of linguistic *representings*.
So there is a broad category of *descriptions*, which contrasts at least with prescriptions, and is less extensive than *declaratives*.
The paradigm (though not the only kind) of description is *empirical* description.
But it comes with two sub-classes: narrow and broad.
Any expressions whose *descriptive* use is *essentially* metalinguistic is only a *broad*, and not a narrow description.
But that is only one special case (important though it is to S) of ways conceptually structured representings can be essential to the subjunctively robust tracking of represented by representings (understood as parallel, with the other homozygotic

9. I am offering this account of

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a) description or fact-stating, less capacious than declarativism, and
b) distinguishing narrow from broad description by dependence of subjunctive tracking on conceptual representings
as the missing piece that connects the two halves of the original diagram: the left-wing and right-wing strands in Sellars.

This probably does not apply to *meaning* expressions. As functional classifiers, they are not only metalinguistic (so only in the broad world, or only broadly real), but also essentially *normative*. Sellars's semantics is not only a nonrelation matter of functional classification, but that classification is normative, in a sense that Sellars (probably) thinks of as involving *prescriptions*—either upstream, as for Hare, or downstream, as consequences of proprieties and other deontic normative locutions. If they are prescriptive, then they are not descriptive—not just not *empirically* descriptive.

<u>Does alethic modal vocabulary have empirical descriptive uses in the narrow sense</u>?

I want to close by arguing that according to these ways of understanding the terms, both facts (expressed by declarative sentences) and subjunctively robust relations of consequence and incompatibility exist in the world in the narrow sense, now read as the world as empirically describable in the narrow sense. (Since facts or states of affairs can be real in the narrow sense, so can properties and relations.)

a) The punchline of Part II, on the descriptive dimension of metalinguistic expressions, and the transition to Part III, on bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism, is the treatment of alethic modality. I want to put this in quite a different box from *abstracta* (not just pure abstracta, but even mixed abstracta, where the underlying vocabulary abstracted from is empirical), and into a box that includes predicates and sentences. All these are part of using concepts at all.

b) One way to put the point is that **what is expressed by alethic modal vocabulary is *no less essential* to concept use *as such* than sentences**—and *so*, if one can make the case for singular terms, for predicates (both monadic, property-expressing, and polyadic, relation-expressing).

c) By contrast, one can *talk* without using terms introduced by abstraction. Although, admittedly, one cannot talk about specifically *mathematical* objects, properties, relations, and facts without such terms. Indeed, if "introducing terms by abstraction" is considered in a sufficiently capacious way, where doing so by treating equivalence relations as identities is just *one*, paradigmatic such method, the essential dependence on expressions introduced by *generically* abstractive methods might be *definitional* of mathematics.

d) For Sellars argued in CDCM (and, for (b), in his very writing that was published: "Concepts as Involving Laws, and Inconceivable without Them") both
   i. Description (rather than mere labeling) requires "situation in a space of implications," and
   ii. Kant-Sellars thesis about modality: the implications that articulate the contents of ordinary empirical descriptive (OED) vocabulary must be subjunctively robust implications (and incompatibilities).
e) This is enough to put what is expressed by alethic modal vocabulary (thought not the use of that vocabulary itself) into a box with *sentences*, as a necessary part of concept *use*.

And Sellars *cannot* maintain that any descriptive vocabulary that essentially involves linguistic expressions in its subjunctive tracking relations *in the sense in which what is subjunctively tracking is the use of linguistic expressions* carves out a proper subset of descriptions in general. *These* expressions are *not meta*linguistic—though of course one can have metalinguistic expressions *for* them.

f) So I want to claim that Sellars *overgeneralized* a *good* lesson from his analysis of expressions introduce by abstraction as *essentially* metalinguistic. Indeed, I am arguing that his conclusion that the semantic interpretants of such expressions should be excluded from inclusion in "the world in the narrow sense" already overgeneralizes that lesson. For the use of abstractions from *empirical* descriptions can have their own descriptive dimension.
g) What is true is that, like normative vocabulary, this descriptive dimension is *parasitic on* the *primary* expressive role of such expressions.

10. If all that is right, then I am looking at distinguishing:
  a) OED vocabulary, divided at any time into
    i. Observational and
    ii. Theoretical vocabulary
  b) OED vocabulary
    i. *must* include *sentences* (not just terms),
    ii. and *if* it has *sub*sentential vocabulary, both terms (singular and sortal) *and* predicates as sentence-frames. As Jumblese shows, there need not be distinct expressions for these.
  c) Alethic modal vocabulary.
  d) Empirical abstractions. These include, but are not limited to:
    i. Event talk.
  e) Pure abstractions, paradigmatically in pure set-theory.
  f) Normative vocabulary. It, too, has a descriptive dimension, but one that is parasitic on the primary expressive role of normative vocabulary, which is to make explicit commitment to the propriety of patterns of practical inference.
  g) Meaning talk: normative-functional classification.

11.   The overarching principle for distinguishing among expressions that have a descriptive use, in the sense of having *both* the right direction of normative fit *and* the right direction of subjunctive tracking—where representings are responsible to (dependent on) representeds *both* normatively *and* alethically—is to look at the roles that norm-governed expressions (cf. meaning-statements as functional classifications) play in *both* dimensions of dependence. *All* expressions are *essentially* involved in *both* dimensions, at the dependent-representation end. In *some* cases, *other* linguistic expressions are *also* involved (in various different roles), in *intermediate* roles in at least the subjunctive tracking relations. These involvements of *other* expressions suffice for the expressions they play essential roles in the dependence relations of to qualify as *genuinely essentially* metalinguistic.

Q: Does this ever happen on the *normative* side?

That is, are linguistic expressions (representings, corresponding to S's "representations of rules") ever essentially involved in the way states of affairs normatively govern claimings using other linguistic expressions?

I would think that this might happen with all terms introduced by abstraction.

If so, does that *always* go along with playing such an essential mediating role on the subjunctive tracking side?

12.   Alethic modal *locutions* are metalinguistic. But what they express is not. Ditto for (most) sentences and predicates, as well as terms (both singular and sortal).

The "space of implications", which Sellars uses to distinguish describing from mere labeling (classifying as mere differential responsiveness) which basically *is* the subjunctive tracking condition (not all labeling is in presence, or is a kind of report-label, so talk of labeling corresponds to the non-observational side of describing) is the criterion of *declarative sentencehood*. For it is the condition of concept-use, conceptual contentfulness, on the semantic side, and the speech act of *assertion*.

That 'space of implications', defining assertibles, expressed by declarative sentences (iron triangle of discursiveness, asserting, declarative sentences, claimable contents: pragmatic, syntactic, and semantic. More on this next meeting.)

  i.   Consists of subjunctively robust implication or consequence relations (supporting inferring practices that go with the asserting practices of declarative sentence use), and

  ii.   Should be taken to include incompatibilities as well. (I'll talk about this reason relation and its relation to consequence or implication next time.)

Conclusion:

I have offered relatively clear ways of making the notions of description, empirical description, and broad/narrow empirical description.
Description is distinguished from prescription Anscombe-wise, by direction of fit.
Empirical descriptions are picked out by the two-dimensional deontic/alethic account in terms of the combination of semantic normative governance and empirical subjunctive tracking.
Narrow empirical descriptions are picked out by the possibility of the subjunctive tracking aspect being satisfied without depending on the intermediate covariance with the tokening of any linguistic expression.
(This last offers a distinctive contrasting sense in which the use of some expressions can count as 'metalinguistic'. For uses where it is *not* possible to have subjunctive tracking without going through the use of other linguistic expressions need not at all be talk *about* those intervening expressions. But playing this role can define also a distinctive sense of 'object' language (or base vocabulary). This will happen when the dependence is of the newly introduced abstract term upon the proper uses of the base vocabulary (object language), which is functioning here as more concrete. (Compare sets, elements, and urelements.)

Each of those definitions:
i) declaratives/assertibles, by 'situation in a space of reasons',
ii) descriptions by normative direction of fit,
iii) empirical descriptions by dual deontic/alethic criteria of semantic normative governance and epistemic subjunctive tracking, and
iv) narrowly empirically descriptive, by possibility of subjunctive tracking unmediated by tokenings of linguistic expressions in another vocabulary,
is defined using metaconceptual raw materials Sellars provides.
　　　I then used those four definitions to argue for the inclusion, in Sellars's 'world in the narrow sense' of

- facts, properties, relations, events, and
- the subjunctively robust relations of implication and incompatibility that make up the "space of implications" needed for description, which are expressed by alethic modal vocabulary.
- But not for *abstracta* 'in general.

The argument for the first three is that they are basically entailed already at the first, declarativist level, and get transmitted from there to everything below.

On this list, everything above (vii) *abstracta* I think *is* in the world in the narrow sense.
Abstracta split: I agree that *pure* abstracta, paradigmatically pure *sets*—∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, {{∅}}… can only be subjunctively tracked by reliably subjunctively covarying chains of events that include tokenings of linguistic expressions.

At least *some* abstractions from things and relations that *are* in the world in the narrow sense, though, I think are also in the world in the narrow sense.

Norms, (viii) I think *can* be in the world in the narrow sense, because nonlinguistic creatures have *affordances*. This is *primitive*, nonconceptual, nondiscursive normativity.

But *conceptual* normativity—and so meanings (ix)—are the paradigm of what is *not* in the world in the narrow sense.

 i. facts (states of affairs), picked out by nominalizations of sentences,

 ii. universals, picked out by nominalizations of monadic predicates,

 iii. relations, picked out by nominalizations of polyadic predicates,

 iv. kinds, picked out by nominalizations of sortal terms,

 v. events, picked out by nominalizations of sentences with temporal connectives,

 vi. subjunctively robust relations of consequence and incompatibility, expressed by alethic modal vocabulary,

 vii. *abstracta*, terms introduced by abstraction: an equivalence relation on relatively more concrete things picked out in a base vocabulary is treated as substitution-licensing identity,

 viii. norms: what is expressed by normative, specifically deontic vocabulary,

 ix. meanings, picked out by expressions that functionally classify other expressions.

Summary:

Nested Kinds of Use	Contrasts with	Defined by
Declaratives Most General Fact-Stating	Imperatives, Interrogatives	'Situation in space of implications' Assertible. Can be premises and conclusions of inferences Embeddable in conditionals and negations Truth-Evaluable
Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Prescriptions	Normative direction of fit is word to world
Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Fictional Descriptions	3) Normative governance of describings by describeds 4) Subjunctive tracking of describeds by describings
Narrowly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Broadly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Subjunctive tracking not necessarily mediated by tokenings of linguistic expressions